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'The last number of LCM' was like the notorious Question 15 in the Logic paper in Greats ('There is no Question 15.') in that it stated of itself something that was not true, though the Editor believed that it would be true when he made it, viz. that the reduction was only 15%. But it appeared that to validate that statement would have meant an unacceptable delay, and so, as readers will have perceived, the reduction was what it has always been this year. This time it is only 15%, even if that shall have meant that this number is even later than what is alas too usual this year. Other false statements were made: the type face was not that suggested by Professor Davies: this is, and he hopes that readers, most of whom seem to have suffered his typographical experiments in silence, will approve it and its reduction. 'Him harsh necessity compels' (i.e. financial - 8 sheets fits the first postal stage of charges) but readers will also note that these 16 pages contain more not less material - indeed one subscriber opined that it should not contain too much, otherwise it would not get read. As he hopes are these notes, which will be longer since he has abandoned the awkwardness of having a contribution on the same page, and will therefore himself have to go on longer (not that he finds it difficult). The Camwil Greek golfball (sorry, type-sphere) broke on p.48 and none of the spare ones had been sent for their necessary repairs, so the IBM 10 pitch has been used at 12 pitch, and the Editor at least thinks it goes better with this type (Letter Gothic) and will probably continue to use it, and finally make good his hope of last month that 'this number of LCM' sees the last of his experiments - which is doubtless also the hope of readers, 348 of them subscribers, whose number was omitted last month when he was pressed for space.

To turn to more serious matters. He reiterates his desire to hear from other Departments of Classics in this country how they are to be affected by the cuts: he had been mulling the idea of publishing Salvetes and Valetes, and is sorry that the first of the latter may be those so necessitated. But from what he hears like death that we have' (he quotes from memory from *The Duchess of Malfi*), and the Editor has long been a (silent) advocate of amalgamation into a few large and strong Departments of Classics in this country, but the wanton destruction of Departments generally acknowledged to be among the strongest in the country (and devoted to scholarship, not communication) moved him as well as others to write. It now appears that closure may have been only a last resort, and that amalgamation may be more likely, and can have merits (the Editor would rather like to see a single Department in London University, probably based on the Institute). Classics is more important than its institutional structure, and our loyalty to our institutions should be municipal, it is of the Republic of our discipline that we are citizens. But it is the business of an Editor to publish (and perish?) not to preach. *Sat prata biberunt.*

The problem of the relationship between Petronius' poem on the Civil Wars (*Sat.* 119ff.) and the *de bello civili* of Lucan is one which has vexed commentators on the *Satyricon* from the earliest times. Petronius' poem has been seen as a simple parody of Lucan on the one hand, and on the other as representing the type of epic Petronius advocated (Virgilian) as opposed to Lucan's supposedly novel treatment. More recently, however, the views have become more complex, beginning with Heitland (in his introduction to C.E.Haskin's edition of Lucan, London 1887, p.xxxvi) who regarded the poem as 'thrown off half in rivalry, half in imitation of Lucan', and whose position was little more than a compromise, and culminating with P.G.Walsh (*The Roman novel*, Cambridge 1970, 46-50) who viewed the poem as an example of how an inferior poet such as Eumolpus would deal with an epic on the Civil Wars, and held that Petronius was thereby criticizing both Lucan's excesses and the weakness of any alternative. More recently P.A.George (*CQ* ns24[1974], 119ff.) has attempted to deny any connexion with Lucan, and argues that Petronius is merely poking fun at Eumolpus' own attempts at poetry.

These more complex recent attempts have come about as a result of doubts about the quality of Eumolpus' poem. In brief, the poem is not bad enough to be good parody (and we would hardly expect failed parody from such a master as Petronius) nor is it good enough to be regarded as a viable alternative to Lucan's poetry. The problem arose because until recently critics have tended to regard the poem as a product of Petronius rather than, as explicitly stated in the *Satyricon*, of Eumolpus. In the last few years, however, Walsh and then George have shown the way to a more realistic interpretation, based first and foremost on the text of the *Satyricon*.

To examine first the character of Eumolpus as portrayed in Petronius' work: it is self evident that he is a wholly disreputable person, both as a poet and as a man. His first attempts at poetry in the art gallery earn only a stoning from his listeners, and even Encolpius is ashamed of him. Indeed Encolpius' attitude to Eumolpus is worthy of note; it is very similar to his attitude to Trimalchio, changing as it does from approval to almost hostility. He first describes him as *senex canus, exercitatus vultus et qui videretur nescio quid magnum promittere* (*Sat.* 83), and then after Eumolpus' first poetic offering he threatens to stone him if he does it again - *ego quoque sinum meum saxis onerabo, ut quotienscunque coeperis a te exire, sanguinem tibi a capite mittam* (*Sat.* 90). Later in the work Eumolpus takes the lead as our heroes try their hand at legacy hunting. Thus Petronius portrays Eumolpus as a man of little poetic talent and even less moral worth. Hardly the ideal credentials for a man to lament the corruption of Rome. To say the least, many of his pronouncements, be they on poetry or anything else, must be taken with more than a few pinches of salt.

Further light will be thrown on the poem on the Civil Wars by an examination of the first piece of poetry Eumolpus delivers, as it is likely to give us clues as to the way we are meant to take his poetry. We have what appears to be a messenger's speech in *senarii* describing the fall of Troy. Despite attempts to see this poem as a parody of Nero's own poem of the sack of Troy there is nothing to connect it with Nero. The more obvious reaction is to think of Seneca and to see it as a parody of his tragedies. Yet this is not the case. The poem is based on Book II of the *Aeneid*, and the language has therefore many Virgilian echoes, indeed the description of the approach of the snakes in Eumolpus' poem (*respicimus ... undae fremunt*) is a point by point plagiarism of lines 203-211 in *Aeneid* II. In addition parts of it show Ovidian influence: the description of the death of Laocoon owes more to Ovid than to Virgil, especially in its use of the cinematographic technique of cutting from one image to the next.

Ovid and Virgil were of course phenomenally popular and influenced much of the literature that came after them. In Ovid's case such was the success of his now lost *Medea* that inferior writers of tragedy after his time doubtless used it as a model. This is what Petronius is mocking, not only the subject matter but also the style, which was probably second nature to the poetasters of this time. The hackneyed nature of both the subject and the way in which it is treated would account for the angry reaction of Eumolpus' audience - they have heard it all before.

It should also be noted in passing that by far the greatest portion of the extant *Satyricon* is taken up with portraits of pretentious mediocrity which could be said to be Petronius' *raison d'être* as a satirist. I think it would be no exaggeration moreover to say that this satirizing of pretentious mediocrity is one of the two main sources of humour in the *Satyricon*, and thus, as the *Satyricon* is primarily a humorous novel, mainstays of Petronius' novel. The other is of course the picaresque farcical humour of Encolpius' and friends' adventures. Thus by realizing that Petronius' main aim is to satirize the pretentious mediocrity of his characters, many of the arguments as to the nature of the work can be seen to be insignificant. Both the Priapus wrath theme and the idea of a parody of the erotic novel are in the *Satyricon*, but they are really only manifestations of the way in which the characters pretend to be more than they actually are. Agamemnon's discussion of oratory, Trimalchio's banquet, Eumolpus' discussion of the fine arts are all examples of the pretentious mediocrity of the characters in the *Satyricon*.

Vital to any interpretation of the poem on the civil wars is the introduction in chapter 118, in which Eumolpus gives his conception of poetry. He takes a traditional, Virgilian

stance against the moderns, but this position should not be taken as representing Petronius' own views on the subject. The argument advanced by Paratore (*Il Satyricon di Petronio*) that the style and language of the passage do not fit in with Eumolpus' character does not take account of the fact that much of the *Satyricon* is written in good Latin, nor that characters just as disreputable as Eumolpus, such as Agamemnon or even Encolpius himself, can speak in stylistically good Latin. Anyway, Eumolpus is never regarded as being uneducated at any point in the *Satyricon*.

It seems to me that this passage is best regarded as an attack by Eumolpus on Lucan and his type of poetry. The description *forensibus ministeriis exercitati* fits well on Lucan after his ban from the Law Courts by Nero, and the phrase *ecce belli civilis ingens opus* ... clearly refers to something of contemporary interest, in all probability Lucan's epic. Taking into account these and other references in the passage which seem to apply specifically to Lucan I feel that we must discount any attempts to deny that Lucan is identified in this passage.

Although I have disagreed with George over chapter 118, I accept his conclusions about the linguistic parallels between the *de bello civili* and Petronius' epic. It would seem that the connexion is not between Petronius and Lucan, but that both Eumolpus and Lucan show similar influences, especially Virgil. Herein lies the clue to the interpretation of the passage. Just as the poem on the sack of Troy was heavily influenced by the Virgilian/Ovidian tradition, so the poem on the Civil Wars can be seen to lie in the tradition of the sub-Virgilian epic, through Rabirius and Severus to the Neronian age. This would fit in well with the character of Eumolpus and the stature of his previous compositions.

Yet a problem remains in George's dismissal of the links with Lucan: the long discussion of moral decline which is found in only one other extant epic, that of Lucan. One would have thought that this was a feature specifically despoiled from historiography by Lucan, yet in chapter 118 Eumolpus does not attack him for his use of historiographical features, he just condemns him for not using the gods or divine machinery in his epic. Moreover, if as we have stated, Eumolpus was following the sub-Virgilian epic, since he includes this feature it is likely that it had already been introduced into the epic tradition, possibly by Rabirius or Severus, from historiography. A possible source for this fusion of genres could be the end of Book I of Virgil's *Georgics*, where a similar discussion is introduced.

It is interesting to note that Lucan's writing of historical epic is not mentioned anywhere as an innovation; the only reason he has gained this reputation is because he is the first extant epic poet after Virgil, and all differences between the two have been put down to Lucan's originality. Curiously enough the idea that this poem in the *Satyricon* was a parody of Lucan tended to give more credence to this belief and obscure the true purpose of the poem. In the light of this fact, Eumolpus' remarks in chapter 118 about historical epic only seem more fatuous. As Agamemnon at the beginning of the work, he is pontificating on a question which is by his time rather out of date - more pretentious mediocrity.

In view of this, we ought perhaps to take a new look at Lucan and his supposed originality. If the use of historiographical features in epic had become part of the tradition - and it is a logical development for the causes of war in epic to become more intellectualized - this feature cannot be regarded as part of Lucan's originality. We are left then with his other main innovation, the absence of divine machinery. The very fact that Eumolpus makes such a point of this would seem to suggest that on this point Lucan had broken away from the tradition to which Eumolpus belongs.

A small matter now arises: what was Petronius' own attitude to Lucan? It has been thought that there was hostility between the two, but if Petronius is poking fun at the critics of Lucan, does this not suggest that he approved of him? Either way nothing can be proved, but this does tend to indicate that the question is not as clear cut as some have thought.

The poem on the Civil Wars which we find in *Sat.* 119ff. is therefore best seen as an attack on the second rate sub-Virgilian type of epic of which Eumolpus was a practitioner. Petronius' purpose here is to satirize the pretentious mediocrity of this second rate bunch of poets, which he does by making them imagine that they are better than Lucan, the foremost poet of the day. In just the same way he satirizes Agamemnon for his pretensions to knowledge of rhetoric and Trimalchio for his manifold pretensions. The realization that this is the purpose of the poem fits it in more neatly with, and aids our interpretation of, the *Satyricon* as a whole. It also shows that Lucan was not the first to introduce historiographical features into epic, but that his true innovation may have been to dispense with divine machinery. We have also seen that there are no grounds for considering Petronius hostile to Lucan. All in all a correct interpretation of the passage on the Civil Wars in the *Satyricon* not only has important implications for the *Satyricon* itself but also for our knowledge of Lucan and of the literature of the Neronian Age.

ROBERT B. TODD (UBC, Vancouver): *Alexander of Aphrodisias, de anima 76.16: Michael of Ephesus' text defended* LCM 7.4 (Apr. 1982), 48-49

1. At *de anima* 76.14-17 Bruns Alexander of Aphrodisias describes the relation between two composite faculties of the soul, that involving judgement (τὸ κριτικόν) and that involving action (τὸ πρακτικόν). I quote the relevant passage together with a supplement from a Byzantine source: ὡς δὲ ἐν τῷ κριτικῷ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικόν, τὸ δὲ ὑπηρετικόν, 14

οὕτως ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρακτικῷ τὸ μὲν ἡγεμονικόν, ὃ ὀρηκτικόν τε καὶ 15

ὀρεκτικόν καλοῦμεν, τὸ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς νεύροις <ὡς ὑπηρετικόν, 16

ὃ καὶ νευροσπαστικόν καλοῦμεν>. δυνάμεις γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ

ἐν τούτοις, καθ' ἣν ὑπηρετεῖται τὸ σῶμα ταῖς καθ' ὅλην ἐνεργεταῖς. 17

16. 'διακονητικόν vel ὑπηρετικόν exordisse videtur post νεύροις', I. Bruns, *app. crit.*

Supplementum Aristotelicum II.1, Berlin 1887. <...> Michael Ephesus, *In Arist. de anim. mot.* (= *Comm. in Arist. Graec.* XXIII.2, ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin 1904), 115.5-6. Vid. P. L. Donini, *RFIC* 96 (1968), 318-9.

2. Donini's discovery in Michael of Ephesus showed that Bruns was right to suspect that something was missing after νεύροις at 76.16, but he did not make out the strongest possible case for accepting Michael's text. He did refer to a passage in the so-called second book (the *mantissa*) of Alexander's *de anima* (also in *Suppl. Arist.* II.1) where (at 105.33-33 Bruns) a contrast is also drawn between the 'controlling' (ἡγεμονικόν) element in the πρακτικόν faculty of the soul that is 'impulsive and desiderative' (ὀρηκτικόν τε καὶ ὀρεκτικόν) and the 'subservient' (ὑπηρετικόν) element that is νευροσπαστικόν. This is helpful but not decisive. The *mantissa* is a heterogeneous collection of texts, some of which are of doubtful authenticity (see Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic physics*, Leiden 1976, 18-19). Indeed, in the passage that Donini cites, νευροσπαστικόν is followed by the clause ἐν ᾧ τὸ φωνητικόν. This has no parallel in the *de anima*, and seem to be a gratuitous piece of Stoicizing with no Aristotelian precedent nor any in Alexander; see Von Arnim, *SVF* II, nos. 827, 828 & 830 for τὸ φωνητικόν as a faculty.

I shall try to show that the text conveyed by Michael of Ephesus can be supported by an Aristotelian source, the influence of which is evident from an analysis of the content of the passage in Alexander. Indirect support can also be drawn from a more authentic external source than the *mantissa*. Since my argument will mainly concern the inclusion of the word νευροσπαστικόν I shall first make a brief comment about the more obviously justifiable ὑπηρετικόν.

3. Bruns presumably suggested that ὑπηρετικόν was needed after νεύροις in order to balance ἡγεμονικόν in the description of the πρακτικόν faculty of the soul, just as ὑπηρετικόν does for the κριτικόν faculty at 76.14 (διακονητικόν is implausible; this rare word is used only once elsewhere in the *de anima*, to describe the sense organs at 59.14). Bruns' suggestion is also supported by the ὑπηρετεῖται at 76.17. Again, later in the treatise, at 99.26-28, we also find the relation ἡγεμονικόν/ὑπηρετικόν proposed for the two faculties of the soul considered at 76.14-17: ἐστὶ δὲ ἐν ἑκατέρῃ δυνάμει, τῇ τε κριτικῇ καὶ τῇ πρακτικῇ, τὸ μὲν ὑπηρετικόν, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικόν. In addition this later passage also specifies the subservient element in these faculties: αἱ τε γὰρ κρίσεις ὑπηρεσίας ὁργανικῆς δεόνται (τοιαῦτα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητήρια), αἱ τε πράξεις καὶ αὐταὶ δι' ὁργάνων ἐπιτελοῦνται. χεῖρες γὰρ καὶ πόδες πρὸς τὰς πράξεις ὄργανα φανερώματα (99.26-30).

Now at *de an.* 76.16, if we follow Michael of Ephesus' text, the subservient element in the πρακτικόν faculty is only identified as 'what we call νευροσπαστικόν'. We shall see next that this term is indeed an appropriate way of characterizing the relation between the organs of the body and the faculty of desire.

4. *de anima* 76.14-17 is the conclusion of a lengthy attempt (starting at 74.13) to establish the relation between the faculty of desire and the other faculties of the soul. Once this is complete Alexander proceeds to give an account of how this faculty causes movements in the body that lead to action. What he in fact offers (at 76.18 - 77.21) is a paraphrase of Aristotle, *de motu animalium* 7, 701b16-702a6. Now at *mot. an.* 701b2-13, the passage that immediately precedes the subject of Alexander's paraphrase, Aristotle compares the motion of animals to the way that puppets work. We need not go into the details of this passage; it has been thoroughly discussed by Martha C. Nussbaum at *HSCP* 80 (1976), 146-152. We can just consider certain aspects of it that will help us understand why Alexander could have used the term νευροσπαστικός.

In the course of his comparison Aristotle likens the sinews (νεῦρα) of an animal to the strings (στρεβλαί) to which a puppet is attached; vid. 701b9. Now at *de an.* 76.16 Alexander's reference to something in the sinews (τι ... ἐν τοῖς νεύροις) also leads into a comparison. This something is 'as it were subservient' (ὡς ὑπηρετικόν), and is 'what we also (καὶ) call νευροσπαστικόν'. This suggests that νευροσπαστικόν is not a technical anatomical term (and there is no evidence that it is), but a term used conventionally to describe something else, and here applied to an aspect of the physical body.

We can establish this conventional use by looking at the cases in which νεῦρον and σπῶν are combined. It covers just the subject of puppetry referred to in Aristotle's comparison in *mot. an.* 7. Thus Xenophon (*Symp.* 4.55) uses νευρόσπαστα to describe puppets, and in a celebrated comparison Plato (*Leg.* 644e) talks of emotions that are like internal νεῦρα that draw us (σπῶν) to action. Ps.-Aristotle, *de mundo* 398b16, uses νευροσπαστής to describe a puppeteer,

and Philo Judaeus, *Fug.* 46, uses $\nu\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\epsilon\lambda\upsilon$ to describe such an agent's activity. The numerous uses of $\nu\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\epsilon\lambda\upsilon$ and the noun $\nu\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\iota\alpha$ that we find in Marcus Aurelius also seem to derive from this comparison with puppetry: Donini noted VI.16 and 28, but see also II.2, III.16, X.38 and XII.19 (the latter recalling the Platonic use at *Leg.* 644e).

Now in all these cases the $\nu\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron$ - prefix refers to a string, or strings, by which a puppet is held, and the suffix from $\sigma\tau\epsilon\lambda\upsilon$ to the puppet's being drawn, or manipulated, in some way. The term $\nu\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ that we find in Michael of Ephesus' text of Alexander is rare. Apart from the passage from the *mantissa* to the *de anima* referred to in 2 above it is only otherwise recorded in LSJ⁹ for a Byzantine author (Eustathius, 457.38) where, as the lexicon rightly suggests, the expression $\eta \nu\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\eta \tau\epsilon\chi\eta$ must mean the skill 'connected with puppet shows'. But this obviously will not suffice for Alexander's usage. For this author it is one of a number of $-\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ adjectives used to describe faculties of the soul; cf. 98.24 - 99.10 for a particularly good example. By this token then $\nu\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ must mean 'the capacity to draw $\nu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\alpha$ ', where $\nu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\alpha$ are in the first instance the strings that hold a puppet, but are also comparable to the sinews of the body. In this single word, then, Alexander has combined a reference to Aristotle's comparison between the motion of animals and the operation of puppets with a description of the actual capacity of the body to obey the commands of the faculty of desire. This seems entirely appropriate in view of the subject of Alexander's paraphrase of *mot.an.* 701b16-702a6 that will immediately follow, for that, as we saw, is Aristotle's complement to his comparison with puppetry.

Naturally Alexander loses the richness of the Aristotelian comparison by reducing it to the single term $\nu\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$. In particular he does not explain what the strings are attached to in a puppet. For Aristotle these are pegs in the central part of the mechanism (701b 3 & 8-9) that are the analogue of bones in the body. The commentator however identifies only the single 'string-drawing' capacity that covers both this controlling mechanism and the movements that it causes. It is enough for him to claim that this whole process is under the general control of the faculty of desire before repeating Aristotle's account of the physiological preconditions for the movement of animals.

Michael of Ephesus' text at *de an.* 76.16 seems then to be well supported by the context of Alexander's discussion, and by the prevailing use of terms that combine $\nu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\alpha$ and $\sigma\tau\epsilon\lambda\upsilon$. But for the sake of completeness it may be worth reviewing another use in Alexander of yet another Aristotelian comparison with puppetry.

5. In his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (at *Comm. in Arist. Graec.* IX, ed. H. Diehls, Berlin 1882) Simplicius (at 310.25ff.) reports a general characterization that Alexander gave of the processes of biological nature. Here it is clear that Alexander has drawn on Aristotle's comparisons of the action of male sperm on female matter to the action of puppets, at *de generatione animalium* II.1, 734b9-17 and II.5, 741b7-9. Cf. especially Alexander ap. Simplicius in *Phys.* 311.7-11 ($\omega\sigma\pi\epsilon\varsigma \epsilon\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma \nu\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\iota\varsigma \tau\eta\upsilon \alpha\rho\chi\eta\upsilon \tau\eta\varsigma \kappa\iota\upsilon\eta\theta\epsilon\omega\varsigma \epsilon\upsilon\delta\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma \tau\omicron\upsilon \tau\epsilon\chi\upsilon\lambda\omicron\tau\omicron\upsilon \tau\omicron\upsilon \pi\rho\omega\tau\omega \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron \mu\epsilon\tau' \alpha\upsilon\tau\eta \kappa\alpha\mu\epsilon\iota\upsilon\tau\omicron \tau\omicron\upsilon \epsilon\pi\epsilon\theta\iota\varsigma \kappa\iota\upsilon\eta\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \gamma\iota\upsilon\upsilon\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$) and *de gen. an.* 734b9-10 ($\epsilon\upsilon\delta\epsilon\chi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota \delta\epsilon \tau\omicron\varsigma\epsilon \mu\epsilon\upsilon \tau\omicron\varsigma\epsilon \kappa\iota\upsilon\eta\theta\alpha\iota, \tau\omicron\varsigma\epsilon \delta\epsilon \tau\omicron\varsigma\epsilon, \kappa\alpha\iota \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota \omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon \tau\alpha \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\alpha \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \sigma\alpha\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\omega\upsilon$); cf. also *de gen. an.* 741b7-9. There is a similar comparison between the operations of nature and the action of puppets in Alexander's treatise on providence, a work preserved only in Arabic; see H. Ruland, *Die arabischen Fassungen von zwei Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias*, diss. Saarbrücken 1976, at 80.13 - 82.4 for a German translation. (I do not think that P. Moraux, *Hermes* 95 [1967], 160 n.2, can be right to link the comparison with puppets in Simplicius' report with Ps. Aristotle *de mundo* 398b16ff.. Alexander may well have known that treatise, but here, as in the treatise on providence, his source is exclusively Aristotle's *de generatione animalium*).

Now in the passages from *de gen. an.* puppets are identified as $\tau\alpha \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\alpha \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \sigma\alpha\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\omega\upsilon$ (734b10 & 741b9), while at *mot. an.* 701b2 they are just called $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$. In the passage from Simplicius reviewed here Alexander calls them $\nu\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\iota\varsigma$ (311.8 & 30) just as at *de an.* 76.16 he employs the term $\nu\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ to describe, as I have argued, the puppet-like capacity of the body to obey the faculty of desire.

There are differences between the two contexts that Alexander himself recognizes. In the case of biological change Aristotle uses the fact that puppets move spontaneously after an initial guiding impetus to characterize the autonomy of certain natural processes; thus Alexander uses the passive form $\nu\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\iota\varsigma$ to reflect his larger claim (Simplicius in *Phys.* 310.25 - 311.37 *passim*) that nature is goal-directed without having conscious reason. In the case of the analysis of desire and action the puppets' movements are related to a central controlling power, and it is the link with this source rather than a detachment from it (as in the biological case) that Aristotle wishes to emphasize. Alexander, as we have seen, complements this account by his schematic description of desire as the element that controls a subservient faculty that has the capacity to behave in a puppet-like fashion.

6. We have defended Michael of Ephesus' text at Alexander, *de an.* 76.16, by showing something of Alexander's method of transforming Aristotelian material. His scholastic use of the image of puppets on a string here, and in the passages discussed in 5, may therefore be added to the long list of such uses in various contexts, literary, scientific and philosophical. For compilations of this material see in addition to Nussbaum (cited in 3 above) J. H. Waszink, *Textullian de anima* (Amsterdam 1947), 136-7; W. Theiler, *Kaiser Marc Aurel: Wege zu Sich Selbst* (Zürich 1951), 340; and E. R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an age of anxiety* (Cambridge 1965), 8-10.

*si licet, hoc sine fraude, Vari dulcissime, dicam
 'dispeream, nisi me perdidit iste Pothus';
 sin autem praecepta vetant me dicere, sane
 non dicam, sed: 'me perdidit iste puer'.*

2 *pothus* BH: *potus* AR: *putus* Scaliger (OCT)

Catalepton 7 is an allusive piece, particularly in the use, without further specification, of *praecepta* in the third line, of which the reference may have been immediately clear to the contemporary audience, but is no longer so to us. This fact, combined with the textual uncertainty at the end of the second line, has led to a variety of interpretations in modern times. Most popular is the view, defended for example by Westendorp Boerma in his commentary, that the correct reading at the end of the second line is *Pothus*, understood as the name of a boy beloved of the poet; the listener, Varius or another, mistakes it as the Greek *πόθος* in its primary signification of 'love', and objects on the grounds of a doctrine of pure Latinity (*praecepta*). This gives reasonable sense, and may be supported with other evidence for the debate over linguistic purism in the later 1st century B.C.. It is, however, difficult not to feel that the last line falls lamentably flat.

I propose to retain the reading *Pothus* and its application as the name of a boy, but to refer *praecepta* to a philosophical rather than a linguistic doctrine. A suggestion of this sort was made by Jachmann (*Hermes* 57[1922], 317-9), who looked to an Epicurean context. Reading *putus* he referred *praecepta* in the first place to the injunctions of that school against the passion of love; the poet then deliberately plays on the ambiguity of the vague *praecepta*, and reframes his statement so as to conform not to a moral teaching, but to the rhetorical precepts which forbid an unliterary word such as *putus*. But I find the exploitation of the vagueness of *praecepta* artificial and forced.

My interpretation starts from the theology rather than the ethics of the Epicureans. The name *Pothus* is by a misunderstanding referred to the divinity of love of that title; the objection is then to the infringement of the Epicurean doctrine that the gods take no part in the affairs of men; the poet complies with a rephrasing that makes plain the human and physical cause of his undoing.

Πόθος is not one of the commonest Greek divine personifications of the power of love; he is, however, a particularly frequent inhabitant of the world of Hellenistic epigram, especially in Meleager, occurring either in the singular or the plural (in the singular, as here, in the following: Posidippus *AP* 5.211 [text uncertain], 12.98; Mnasalces 9.324; Phanias 12.31; Meleager 5.214, 12.54, 157 & 167; Rufinus 5.87; anon. 5.100). The Hellenized audience of the Naples area might very naturally understand *Pothus* in our epigram in the same way. It is worth noting that the plural *Πόθοι* occurs twice in the epigrams of Philodemus (*AP* 9.570, 10.21); it is conceivable that the light verses of the famous Epicurean were a contributory stimulus to an argument about the admissibility of poetry and poetic language among an Epicurean circle.

There is no direct evidence for Epicurus' own statements on the conventional divinities of love; but according to Diogenes of Tarsus the Epicureans denied that *ἔρως* was *θεοποιητός* (Diogenes Laertius 10[Epicurus].118.8), possibly as a counter to the seductive teachings of Plato, who was given to discussing his ideas on love with the aid of the traditional divinities of the passion and other personifications. On a more general level obvious parallels for the reduction of the sentimentalities of love to the material reality may be drawn from the fourth book of Lucretius: *haec Venus est nobis; hinc autemst nomen amoris* (1058) - a line which sums up a passage of crude physical description, and in which Lucretius attacks the conventional divinities of love (I take it that *nomen amoris* does refer to a deity of love, whether the name of that deity is understood as *Cupido* or *Amor*).

*sed tamen esto iam quantovis oris honore,
 cui Veneris membris vis omnibus exoriatur:
 nempe aliae quoque sunt ... 1171-3
 stultitiaque ibi se damnet, tribuisse quod illi
 plus videat quam mortali concedere par est.
 nec Veneres nostras hoc fallit ... 1183-5
 nec divinitus interdum Vnerisque sagittis
 deteriore fit ut forma muliercula ametur. 1278-9*

Even if the poet were to claim that he should not be suspected of seriously believing in powerful gods with names like *Pothus* or *Eros*, the Epicurean might still object to his use of language. The use of personifications for poetic effect would contradict the Epicurean requirement that language be true to its nature of a system of signs referring to empirical facts; the criteria of literalness and clarity would condemn these poetic conceits. Lucretius, in the context of a discussion of conventional religion, shows the Epicurean concern for plain language as a prophylactic against muddled thinking:

*hic siquis mare Neptunum Cereremque vocare
 constituet fruges et Bacchi nomine abuti*

*mauult quam laticis proprium proferre vocamen,
concedamus ut hic terrarum diatitet orbem
esse deum matrem, dum vera re tamen ipse
religione animum turpi contingere parcat.* 2.655-670

Lucretius' own solution probably represents only one, and that very possibly unorthodox, of the Epicurean answers to this problem.

Two further points may be raised, which may support my case. Line one of the poem is normally punctuated after *licet*, so that *sine fraude* qualifies *dicam*, the easiest sense then being 'frankly, openly'. This gives sense, but introduces a thought which is not essential to the point of the epigram, whether we take that point to be concerned with linguistic or philosophical precepts. With the proposed interpretation it is tempting to refer *sine fraude* to the context of philosophical heresy; this may be achieved either by taking the phrase with *si licet* and understanding *dicere* from the apodosis; or, with less awkwardness, by extending the protasis to *dicam*, with a slight ellipse of thought between the protasis and apodosis. *sine fraude* in the sense of 'without deception, without error', would be inept if applied to a solecism, but suitable in a context of false theology or even of potentially misleading language. One may compare Lucretian uses of *fraus* in the sense of 'delusion, error' 4.816-7:

(cf. 2.187 & 6.187) *deinde adopinamur de signis maxime parvis
ac nos in fraudem induimus frustraminis ipsi*

Secondly, there is a possible additional point in the last line. *iste puer* appears unambiguously to denote the boy Pothus. But in an amatory context one might think of another *puer*, the boy-god of love, whichever name he appears under. For the form of expression I take two Ovidian examples:

*at fuerat melius, si te puer iste tenebat,
quem tu nescio quas dicis habere faces ...* Her. 21.125-6
adfluit incautis insidiosis Amor.

Finally one may note the frequent play in the Greek epigrammatists on the interchangeability of the human boyfriend and the boy-god of love, e.g. Meleager AP 12.54:

*ἀρνεῖται τὸν ἔρωτα τεκεῖν ἢ Κύπρις Ἰδοῦσα
ἄλλον ἐν ἡϊθέοις ἱμερον Ἀντίλοχον.
ὦλλά, νέοι, στέργετε νέον Πόδον· ἡ γὰρ ὁ κοῦρος
εὖρηται κρείσσων οὗτος ἔρωτος ἔρωτος.*

Catalepton 7 would thus end with a playful deception of the Epicurean critic; an unintentionally ambiguous way of speaking is replaced by one deliberately open to misinterpretation.

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M.CROPP(Calgary): Euripides Elektra 1013-7 and 1041-4

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The speech in which Klytaimestra attempts to justify her murder of Agamemnon is full of rhetorical artifice. Two of her ploys still seem to be in need of elucidation. I shall take the simpler problem first.

1041-5

*εἴ δ' ἐκ δόμων ἥρπαστο Μενέλεως λάθρα,
κτανεῖν μ' ὀρέστην χοῖν, κσιγνήτης πόσιν
Μενέλαον ὡς αἰσάμι; σὸς δὲ πῶς πατὴρ
ἠνέσχετ' ἄν ταῦτ'; εἴτα τὸν μὲν οὐ θανεῖν
κτείνοντα χοῖν τᾶμ', ἐμὲ δὲ πρὸς κείνου παθεῖν;*

In discussing this passage recently, Diggle¹ has suggested that οὐ θανεῖν ... χοῖν has too often been taken as equivalent to μὴ θανεῖν ... χοῖν, i.e. 'ought he not-to-have-died?'. In fact, as Diggle says, it is χοῖν which is negated by οὐ. But Diggle then proceeds to understand this as 'ought-not he to have died?', and to supply us with a new line after 1045 so that Klytaimestra will be saying 'Then ought not he to have died for killing my child and I to have suffered no less at his hands for killing his child?'. This is to mistake the effect of the μέν/δέ contrast following εἴτα, which in fact is to point out the absurd contradiction between the implication of Klytaimestra's hypothetical case (it would have been thought *right* for her to be punished if she had killed Orestes) and the implication drawn by others from the actual case (it was thought *wrong* for Agamemnon to be punished for killing Iphigenia). The correct translation of εἴτα ... παθεῖν (if πρὸς κείνου παθεῖν is acceptable: but see below) is 'was it then not-right for him to die as the killer of my child, yet right for me to suffer at his hands?'. The pattern of οὐ θανεῖν ... χοῖν is exactly paralleled by οὐ θνήσκουσιν χρεών; in *Herakles* 156 ('Is this what makes it not-right for Herakles' children to die?')², while *Andromache* 663-7 provides an exact parallel for the structure of the whole argument (including the summation of the *actual* case in the

1. James Diggle, 'Notes on the *Electra* of Euripides', *Illinois Classical Studies* 2(1977), 110-124; the present passage is discussed on pages 121-2.

2. For ellipse of χοῖν in the δέ-clause following οὐ χοῖν in the μέν-clause cf. *Ion* 1314-5 (which Diggle quotes for a different purpose); further, Kühner-Gerth II p.566 (k).

μέν-clause and the *hypothetical* case in the δέ clause);

ἦν παῖς μὲν ἡμῇ μὴ τέκη, ταύτης δ' ἄπο
βλάστωσι παῖδες, τῆσδε γῆς θηϊώτιδος
στήσεις τυράννοισι, βάρβαροι δ' ὄντες γένος
Ἑλλήσιν ἄρξουσ'; εἴτ' ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ φρονῶ
μισῶν τὰ μὴ δίκαια, σοὶ δ' ἔνεστι νοῦς;

Andr. 663-7

Here the second sentence means 'Am I then out of my senses in hating what is unjust, yet you in your senses (sc. in hating it)?' It obviously cannot mean 'Am-I-not, then, in my senses .. etc.'³.

At the least, then, οὐκ ἐλάσσονα is inappropriate in the supplement which Diggle proposes. And the elliptical brevity of ἐμὲ δὲ πρὸς κείνου παθεῖν presents no real difficulty in the light of *Andr.* 667 (cited above) or Sophocles *EL* 545 (cited in note 3). The only serious question is whether to accept πρὸς κείνου παθεῖν, 'to suffer at his hands'. Diggle reiterates the view of Denniston and Jackson that παθεῖν here needs an object (which his supplementary line supplies, whereas Denniston proposed to substitute θανεῖν and Jackson, less plausibly, πόθεν;). The lack of an object is certainly harder to accept here than in other cases, but one cannot always be eliminating the hardest instance of a usage, and this instance is not startlingly harder than others where παθεῖν without an object means 'to receive retribution'. So I am not convinced that emendation is necessary, and only hesitantly speculate that Euripides wrote something which could easily have caused corruption through misunderstanding and which incorporates Denniston's θανεῖν:-

εἴτα τὸν μὲν οὐ θανεῖν
κτείνοντα χορὴν τάμ', ἐμὲ δὲ τὰ κείνου θανεῖν;

'Was it then wrong for him to die as the killer of my child, yet right for me to die as the killer of his?'

The repetition of θανεῖν has a parallel in the repetition of πάρεισι in *Or.* 583-4 (cited in note 3). And the corruption of both τὰ κείνου and θανεῖν, while less plausible at first sight, would be understandable as a direct result of the elliptical compression of the phrase⁶: 1) θανεῖν is changed to παθεῖν, on the false assumption that τὰ κείνου should be the object of a transitive verb⁷; 2) the resulting sense of τὰ κείνου παθεῖν - 'to suffer what he deserved to suffer?' - is awkward enough to lead to the further 'improvement' of τὰ κείνου to πρὸς κείνου.

1013-1017

λέξω δέ· καίτοι δόξ' ὅταν λάβῃ κακὴ
γυναικα, γλώσση πικρότης ἔνεστί τις,
ὥς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν οὐ καλῶς· τὸ πρῶγμα δὲ
μαδόντας, ἦν μὲν ἀέλιος μισεῖν ἔχη,
στυγεῖν δίκαιον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τί δεῖ στυγεῖν

μαδόντα σ', corr. Reiske. ἔχης, corr. Seidler

It is generally assumed that the γλώσσα in 1014 belongs to the woman who is suffering from a bad reputation. Since γλώσσα can denote either 'tongue' or 'discourse', the πικρότης

3. It is hardly necessary to illustrate, in general, the Greek habit of using μὲν and δέ in this way to advertise the mutual inconsistency of a pair of facts or inferences; but Klytaimnestra's words in the similar argument at Sophocles *EL* 544-5 are an especially apt illustration

ἢ τῷ πανάλει πατρὶ τῶν μὲν ἔξ ἐμοῦ
παίδων πόθος παρεῖτο, Μενέλαω δ' ἐνῆν;

and (to say nothing of Euripides *IA* 396-9) Orestes' words at Euripides *Or.* 583-4 are hardly less apt

ἢ μητρὶ μὲν πάρεισι σύμμαχοι θεαί,
τῷ δ' οὐ πάρεισι, μᾶλλον ἡδίκημέναι;

For εἴτα introducing such paradoxes, cf. also Euripides *Pho.* 547-9 and Aristophanes *Clouds* 1292-5.

4. Further to Diggle's discussion of the conditions for absence of an object to παθεῖν (n.26 of art.cit. in n.1, citing Denniston and Jackson), see *CQ* ns29(1979), 56. Additional instances which can be related with 'the proverbial πάθει μάθος' (Denniston in the Addenda to his commentary) are Sophocles *EL* 384, *Ant.* 926, Euripides *Hek.* 580, and with the δοῦν/παθεῖν antithesis Sophocles *OC*
5. Jackson's πόθεν; is simply superfluous in the light of the parallels I have cited for this pattern of argument.
6. Cf. again Sophocles *EL* 545, where the genitive Μενελάω was in danger of being converted to the dative Μενελάῳ, as Jebb's apparatus records.
7. At Sophocles *OT* 722, which Denniston cites, παθεῖν seems similarly to be a variant due to the mistaken belief that τὸ δεινόν should be the object of a transitive verb. Modern editorial opinion is divided - e.g. for θανεῖν Schneidewin, Jebb, L.Campbell, Dain and Kamerbeek; for παθεῖν Brunck, W.Dindorf, Pearson and Dawe. To my mind the vividness and explicitness achieved with θανεῖν make it preferable. The repetition of πρὸς παιδὸς θανεῖν from 713 (and cf. 854) tells for rather than against θανεῖν: 'the words of the prophecy are repeated', L.Campbell. On the other hand, it is hard to see why παθεῖν should ever have been displaced by θανεῖν, which would certainly have been superfluous as a marginal explanation.

which is 'in' it may then be either the emotionally bitter tone of what she says or the adverse ('galling') impact of this upon her listeners. The first of these is favoured by e.g. Denniston in his commentary ad loc. with the paraphrase 'I will tell you what I think of Agamemnon. But a maligned woman has a sharp edge to her tongue. In my opinion this bitterness is to be deplored. But she should not be condemned out of hand on account of it: she should be judged on the facts alone'. The second is summed up in Seidler's rendering of γλώσση πικρότης ἐνεστί τις as *orationi eius inveni quid inest*⁸.

The case made by Denniston (repeated by Diggle) against Seidler's line of interpretation is rather persuasive: 'ἐνεστί strongly suggests that πικρότης is a quality residing in the tongue'. γλώσση could of course mean 'discourse', but either way it is to the γλώσσα that the πικρότης is said to belong, οὐ καλῶς.

On the other hand Denniston's interpretation produces a curious argument. Klytaimestra apologizes in advance for speaking bitterly - which, she implies, is due to her having been maligned - and then goes on to say that she should not be hated for speaking bitterly unless the facts justify her bad reputation. Surely it is more to the point for her to be saying that she ought not to be hated for killing Agamemnon (unless the murder was unjustified). And this is how one would naturally read lines 1015-7 (τὸ πρᾶγμα δὲ ... τί δεῖ στυγεῖν) unless Denniston's rendering of 1013-4 were predisposing one otherwise. Another minor oddity is that Klytaimestra is, according to Denniston, not only advertising her own bitterness but condemning it when she says ὡς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν, οὐ καλῶς (1015). Diggle⁹ has suggested circumventing this difficulty by reading οὐ κακῶς, but this still leaves the major difficulty untouched.

I suggest that the initial assumption - that the γλώσσα of 1014 belongs to the maligned woman - needs to be re-examined. Diggle mentions, but promptly dismisses, Matthiae's suggestion that it belongs to the woman's detractor¹⁰. But I think that the structure of the whole passage favours Matthiae's suggestion, or at least something very like it.

After λέγω, the καίτοι-sentence introduces a consideration which, the speaker suggests, puts him at a disadvantage in making his ensuing argument; cf. for example Aristophanes *Acharn.* 368-9

λέγω δ' ὅπερ Λακεδαιμονίων ἄ μοι δοκεῖ.
καίτοι δέδοικα πολλά ...

The δέ-sentence then introduces a point which overcomes this difficulty¹¹. The disadvantage Klytaimestra alludes to might conceivably be the fact that she is embittered by long years of unpopularity. But it is much more likely to be her bad reputation in itself. This is confirmed by the fact that δόξα is the first word of the καίτοι-sentence, and τὸ πρᾶγμα the first of the δέ-sentence. 'My reputation may create prejudice against my defence', says Klytaimestra, 'but the plain facts ought to correct this prejudice'¹².

If this is so, the words ὡς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν, οὐ καλῶς are entirely apt. Diggle suggests that the μὲν and δέ of 1015 must point a real contrast, which he wants to restore by reading οὐ κακῶς so that Klytaimestra compares what she thinks with what others are entitled to think once they know the facts. But this is not necessary. The μὲν may very well be solitary, or it may be subsumed in the καίτοι-sentence¹³; either way what the δέ really responds to is καίτοι.

In the context of this δόξα/πρᾶγμα distinction, γλώσση in 1014 can readily be understood as the tongue (or talk) of people whose criticism is mere words founded on belief, not on facts (or it might even be the tongue of δόξα itself personified). The πικρότης is the bitterness (or better the bitingness¹⁴) of this criticism. Klytaimestra's argument against prejudice is not essentially different from these:-

Hek. 1187-8

Ἀγάμεμνον, ἀνδράποισιν οὐκ ἔχρην ποτε
τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν γλῶσσαν ἰσχύειν πλεόν.

Hipp. 983-5

πάτερ, μένος μὲν εὐστασίς τε σὺν φρενῶν
δεινὴ τὸ μέντοι πρᾶγμα, ἔχον καλοῦς λόγους,
εἴ τις διαπτύξειεν, οὐ καλὸν τόδε.

Antiope fr. 32 Kambitsis

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τὰ πρᾶγματα
κρίσω νομίζω τῶν λόγων ἀεὶ ποτε.

And for γλώσση πικρότης ἐνεστί the best parallel is

Ba. 269-270

οὐ δ' εὐτροχὸν μὲν γλῶσσαν ὡς φρονῶν ἔχεις,
ἐν τοῖς λόγοισι δ' οὐκ ἐνεῖσι σοι φρένες.

One incidental point: there is no need to look for a subject for ἔχη in 1016 (whether 'she' or τὸ πρᾶγμα). ἀξίως μισεῖν ἔχει is simply the equivalent of ἀξιὸν ἐστὶ μισεῖν, 'it is justified to hate [her]'. Cf. *IA*. 447 δορυῖσαι ῥαδίως ... ἔχει & 1257 δεινῶς δ' ἔχει ... τολμήσαι, *Fr*. 572 δρᾶν δ' ἀμνηστῶς ἔχει, and the more widespread use of ἀναγκάτως ἔχει + inf., ὁρθῶς ἔχει + inf..

8. Diggle, loc. cit. n.1, p.120 n.20, cites a number of scholars agreeing with Seidler.

9. Diggle 119-121. 10. Diggle 120 n.21.

11. Denniston, *Greek Particles*², 557(iii).

12. Broadly similar, in that the speaker combats prejudice against herself aroused by a feature of her situation, are *Antr.* 186-191 and *Med.* 292ff..

13. Denniston, *Greek Particles*², 558(iv).

14. Cf. e.g. Euripides *Tro.* 441, *HF* 1288, *Ion* 1325, *Hel.* 481 & *Hik.* 834, Sophocles *Ajax* 500 & *OC* 951.

The upshot of this analysis is better summarized in a paraphrase than in a direct translation: 'I will tell you about Agamemnon. It is difficult for me to defend myself, for when ill repute seizes a woman the talk it inspires [or consists of] about her has - unfairly enough, in my opinion - a certain harshness. Yet it is the facts that count. When people have learned them, if hatred is justified, it is fair to hate her; but if it is not, why should one hate her [sc. for her reputation alone]?'.

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Review: H.D.JOCELYN(Manchester)

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Pelagonius. *Ars ueterinaria*. edidit Klaus-Dietrich Fischer. Leipzig, 1980. BSB B.G.Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, pp.XLV, 203. Cased, DDR 60,-M (order number 665 899 1).

Since the year 1472 editions of the erotic poems of Catullus, Tibullus and Propertius have issued from printing presses in scores; commentaries, monographs, articles and notes in hundreds (most professional scholars have the same feeble appetite for factual knowledge as the audiences to whom they pander, and it is easy to do that which many have done before). The remains of Pelagonius' treatise on the cure of equine ailments, on the other hand, have been edited only three times during the same period: by Guiseppe Sarchiani in 1826, by Maximilian Ihm in 1892, and by Klaus-Dietrich Fischer in 1980. Other bibliography is minuscule. And yet the fundamental division in pagan Roman society was that between the horseman and the pedestrian. Many a *paterfamilias* would have been at least as much concerned by the ailments of his horses as by the infatuations of his legitimate sons. The chariot races which took place in the *circi* at frequent intervals throughout the year were the major entertainments of all social classes. They were run on genuinely holy days and the gods themselves shared the pleasure of the spectacle. Only the best and healthiest animals raced. The genuine student of pagan civilization will therefore not neglect any text which documents interest in the horse. Pelagonius moreover used many words absent from erotic poetry, and indeed from the rest of classical literature, but no less interesting to genuine students of Latin (if not to the makers of the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*) than the vocabulary of the dining-room and the bedroom. Fischer's brass-gutted audacity accordingly deserves applause. His presentation of the evidence for what Pelagonius wrote is not perfect, and his editorial judgement is often open to challenge, but he assembles fresh material and offers a large number of ideas absent from Ihm's volume, some of his own, others originally published in very obscure places. Thirty-five prefatory pages discuss the history of the text of the treatise, while forty-eight of commentary attempt to explain what Pelagonius was writing about.

Our treatise originated in aristocratic circles where horses were bred for the *certamina sacra*. It cannot post-date the ban which the Christian state placed upon these *certamina*. We are a long way from the milieu of the dealers who supplied animals for military, agricultural or commercial purposes, and the lowly *mulomedici* whom such dealers and their clients occasionally employed. Pelagonius was himself no landed aristocrat, but rather some sort of practitioner. The phrase *apopiras Pelagoni* (18 *et saepe alibi*) obviously comes from an editor rather than from Pelagonius himself. Nevertheless it must relate to claims apparent in the original text. At 216 there is described a physical examination by Pelagonius of a *uir clarissimus* who suffered, like some of his horses, from kidney trouble. The conclusion is inescapable that Pelagonius was here operating in a professional capacity. He arranged the material he decided to publish on horse medicine in the form of a collection of letters on specific topics addressed to *uiri clarissimi*, to *philocali*. The man to whom the collection as a whole was addressed, one Arzygius, perhaps the *consularis Tusciae et Umbriae* of CIL VI 1702, had written some kind of encomium on horses whose style Pelagonius felt himself unable to emulate (*ep.ded.*). Nevertheless we should not take too much notice of our author's modesty. He had read such elegant stylists as Celsus and Columella, and if he had really lacked confidence in his own Latinity he would not have dared to address publicly a man like Arzygius. P.Vegetius Renatus, who wrote with classical correctness, rated Pelagonius' style inferior to Columella's, but put it in a quite separate category from that of the Latin translations of Chiron and Apsyrtos.

Pelagonius' treatise soon acquired a degree of authority. Vegetius used it as one of the sources of his *Digesta artis mulomedicinae* (ed. E.Lonnmatzsch, B.G.Teubner, Leipzig 1903). It was translated into Greek (hardly more than once, despite Fischer, *GRBS* 20[1979], 371-5) and placed in Greek libraries alongside the books of Eumelos, Apsyrtos *et al.*. Our knowledge depends on Vegetius' citations, on the excerpts from the Greek translation found in various Byzantine compilations of material relating to veterinary medicine (ed. E.Oder & K.Hoppe, *Corpus Hippiatricorum Graecorum*, B.G.Teubner, Leipzig 1924-27, repr. Stuttgart 1971; on shortcomings in this collection see G.Björk, *Apsyrtus, Julius Africanus et l'hippiatrique grecque*, Upsala 1944 [Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift 1944, 4] and A.M.Doyen, 'Les textes d'hippiatrie grecque', *AC* 50[1981], 258-73), on a copy of a now lost medieval manuscript of a *commentum artis medicinae seu ueterinariae Pelagoniorum Saloniniorum* made in the year 1485 for the great Florentine scholar Politian, and on four re-used leaves of a sixth century manuscript which carried either Pelagonius' treatise or one prescribing the same treatments in much the same order.

No one can doubt that on the one hand the Florence codex lacks much of what was in Pelagonius' autograph and on the other contains, as well as the usual amount of nonsense arising from the inattention of scribes, elements deliberately added over a long period of time from other sources. There are many morpho-syntactical and orthographical items which are hard to credit in a work addressed to fourth century senators. Clearly Pelagonius' treatise came to serve the utilitarian purposes of men of less exalted station and acquired from its users over the centuries a character somewhat different from the one it originally possessed. Fischer puts forward in his preface a complex theory of textual history in order to account for the phenomenon (pp.xi-xv & xxv; for a clear English summary see pp.290-94 of his essay 'Pelagonius on Horse Medicine', in F.Cairns ed., *Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar Third Volume, Area 7*, Liverpool 1981, 285-303). He believes that the last in a series of excerptors, interpolators and compilers responsible for what we now read in the Florence codex had, besides a main exemplar incorporating the results of a tradition of practical adaptation, collections of veterinary material citing Pelagonius by name and a mutilated copy of the original treatise; at the same time, however, that the *Commentum artis medicinae seu veterinariae Pelagoniorum Saloninorum* does not differ radically from Pelagonius' autograph. This seems to me the merest wishful thinking. Who would have had a motive for trying to restore the original form of the treatise? Vegetius simply dismisses as 'unjust' Vegetius' statement that Pelagonius omitted the *signa causaeque morborum* (prol.3). This was certainly an exaggeration (at 216, 287, 302 & 363 the topic appears in introductory epistles whose Pelagonian authorship can hardly be denied), but students of textual history ought to be very suspicious of sections 33 (the epistle to Arzygius has clearly dropped out - who would begin an epistle *ad febrim. febricantis signa sunt ... ?*), 139-141 (the epistle to Festianus has dropped out), 204-5, 210 (possibly, however, part of an epistle to Festianus), 267 (possibly part of an epistle to Papianus), 403, 404, 408 and 409. There was no reason for Vegetius to misrepresent the nature of Pelagonius' treatise. Either he had an extremely defective copy or, more likely, the passages in question entered the tradition after his time. Wherever we can see clearly enough to be sure, Vegetius had before him a fuller (see 3.14.2-4, 27.3 and compare 3.13.3 with Pelagonius 390) or better organized text (compare his handling of colic and the effects of eating mildewed hay or too much barley at 2.116, 136 & 137 with Pelagonius 287-91) than that of the Florence codex. It may be significant that Apsyrtos or Eumelos looks like the ultimate source in most of the suspect passages.

From photographs Fischer reports in great detail the contents of cod.Florence, Bibl.Riccardiana 1179, ff.1-28, including the corrections made for or by Politian. I am a little sceptical about Fischer's claim to be able to distinguish Politian's corrections from those of his agent. Since all the corrections were made entirely on the basis of the medieval exemplar we may be confident that wherever a correction occurs we know what was in the exemplar. That, however, is not the case where the transcript stands uncorrected. Politian was no superman. Those who have checked his collations of extant ancient and mediaeval manuscripts have found him overlooking discrepancies (cf. R.Ribuoli, *La collazione Poliziana del codice Bembino di Terenzio*, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Rome 1981). Fischer's laborious report of every correction thus has a certain negative utility for the critic. The marginal annotations, on the other hand, are completely irrelevant to the study of Pelagonius' text and its transmission. The student of fifteenth century scholarship will do better to visit Florence or to purchase photographs of the twenty-eight folia than to hunt through Fischer's apparatus.

Where cod.Naples, Bibl.Naz.2, ff.37-41, coincides with the Florence codex Fischer prints parallel texts. I am not sure that this was wise. Ihm either used the Naples variants to correct the Florence text or left them in his apparatus, thereby showing due caution about their status and at the same time concealing no facts from the attentive reader.

Fischer's report of the secondary evidence is as parsimonious as his report of the primary is generous. I regret to have to point out that as a result the new edition cannot be used without constant and extremely toilsome recourse to Vegetius' *Digesta* and the Byzantine veterinary compilations. The confidence it exudes about the general superiority of the direct Latin transmission may be just but students need to be shown all the evidence clearly and dispassionately.

In the 'testimonia' which he prints between his text and apparatus criticus Fischer fails to distinguish specific citations of Pelagonius by Vegetius from parallel passages which may or may not reflect dependence. I cannot find in the new edition the evidence which Vegetius provides for quite different texts of 390 (3.13.3: not even referred to in the testimonia or in the 'index comparativus codicum Bo et R', section F, [p.xxxiii] or in the list titled 'lectiones quaedam codicis R cum Vegetio et interpretatione Graeca comparantur' [pp.xxiii-vii], 423 (3.27.4), and 424 (3.27.5). Vegetius' very important statement about the style and contents of Pelagonius' treatise (prol.2-3) has to be sought in a footnote to Fischer's 'praefatio' (p.ix n.1).

The Greek translation of Pelagonius' treatise is now much better known than it was in Ihm's day, and Fischer feels able to add twenty-six new fragments to Ihm's forty, to discard three of the latter and to offer markedly different texts of eleven. Here we have scientific progress. It must, however, be said that Ihm presented his knowledge of the Greek translation much more systematically and instructively than Fischer does his. The maker of this translation may have been ignorant of the finer points of Latin and of veterinary science, but he

had access to a manuscript carrying a text of Pelagonius' treatise significantly different in many places from the one carried by the Florence codex. The translation provides evidence which an editor of Pelagonius' *'Ars Veterinaria'* (the title on the cover of Fischer's volume) cannot eliminate, and indeed Fischer bases upon items in it some of his own conjectural alterations to the Florence codex. If the text of the Naples codex was to be reported entire, so too should have been that of the translation, at least as far as current knowledge of the Byzantine hippiatric codices permitted. There were perhaps economic difficulties (the home of the publishers is the German Democratic Republic). But if so the careful fashion in which Oder and Hoppe reported the Latin divergences in their apparatus to the Pelagonian areas of the Byzantine compilations offered a model of procedure which Fischer could with advantage have followed.

Some of the material immediately underlying the text of the Florence codex is extant. Fischer refers to this in his testimonia without distinguishing it from other kinds of parallel material. He reports few details in his apparatus.

The transmitted text of Columella 6.5, 17, 27-35 & 38 permitted Sarchiani and Ihm to make many corrections to Pelagonius 1-4, 21-22, 30, 32, 43, 108, 162, 170, 279-80, 307, 359 & 437. K. Hoppe suggested several more, one of which Fischer prints (*ueratro* at 359: *attroci*). It is quite wrong not to distinguish such changes from palaeographical and other kinds of conjectures. In some cases the passage was added from Columella with little change. In others Columella was rewritten in ways of great linguistic interest (cf., e.g., the replacement of Columella 6.29.2 *cauda longa et setosa crispae* at 2 with *cauda longa et non setosa quia abdecet*; the replacement of 30.1 *plus prodest ... quam si* at 30.1 [the coincidence of these two references is correct, but in a manuscript would surely lead to emendation! Ed.] with *multum prodest ... quam si*; the replacement of 31.1 *succo ... faucibus infuso* at 108 with *succo ... in fauces infuso*; the discarding of the passive indicatives of 30.4 at 162; the replacement of 17.6 *conlectionem resicare* at 279 with *collectum resicare*; the replacement of 32.2 *praecipue ... huius noxae salutaris est adeps marini vituli, sed si iam inueterauit ... opus est* at 359 with *item aliud salutare remedium. in initiis adeps vituli marini, sed si iam inueterauerit ... opus est*; the replacement of 33.2 *omnisque dolor oculorum inunctione suoi plantaginis cum melle acapno ... leuatur* at 437.1 with *omnisque dolor oculorum inunctionem cum melle acapno desiderat*). The exact relationship between the text of Columella and that of Pelagonius ought to have been delineated in each case. Nemesis has already struck. Fischer himself declares at *Philologus* 125(1981), 157: '*Pelagonius scheint, wie aus den bei ihm überlieferten Columellapassagen ersichtlich, an der sprachlichen Form der von ihm in sein Buch aufgenommenen Rezepte keine Änderungen vorgenommen zu haben.*'. Small details can never be neglected in philological work.

The transmitted parts of the books of Eumelos and Apsyrτος are less useful to the critic of the text of the Florence codex, but full quotation, for example, of *Hipp.* I p. 179.9-12 ... καὶ σκεπάζοντες αὐτὸν ἐπιβλήμασι, καὶ χαλινώσαντες ἀγεῖν εἰς τόπον εὐήλιον, γυμνάζοντας δρόμῳ τῷ διὰ τῆς πόλεως, ἐπισκεπόμενον τινὸς αὐτῷ, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἰδῶσαι ἐπὶ πλεῖστον would at least elucidate its thoroughly ambiguous progeny, 269.2 *post hanc curam cooperimus sagis et in sole calido sedentes exercemus tripodo usque ad sudorem*. The Greek translation, μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀγωγὴν ταύτην στρώμασι σκεπάζον, καὶ εἰς ἥλιον θερμὸν ποίησον στήναι, καὶ ἀναβάτην ἐπισκεπῶσαι πορεύσας, δρόμῳ τῷ διὰ πόλεως γυμνάζεσθαι τῷ λεγομένῳ τριπῶδι, ἀχρεὶς οὐ ἰδῶσαι (*Hipp.* I pp. 189.27-190.2), and Vegetius' adaptation, *post curam operitur sagis, et in sole calido exercetur a sessore tripodans usque dum sudet* (2.111.11), confirm that Pelagonius, or whoever was responsible for the Latin of 267-70 (Fischer, *Philologus* 125[1981], 155-8, argues from the absence of -que that it was someone other than Pelagonius), wrote more briefly than Apsyrτος but must leave the *sedentes* of the Florence codex suspect. Fischer may well have thought hard and long about this and similar problems and come to honest conclusions. Most readers, however, of a book like his are likely to be as much interested in the problems as in the editor's conclusions.

Fischer catalogues the interpretations and conjectures of earlier scholars very generously. We could, however, do without those of Sarchiani's which subsequent research disproved and which Ihm sensibly passed over. On the other hand some conjectures and orthographical adjustments of Ihm's had at least the virtue of fingering items of sub-standard Latin which might have been perpetrated by one of the 'redactors' but hardly by Pelagonius himself. These should have been recorded. Fischer claims for himself the deletion of the completely otiose *tanquam* at 183.2, but Ihm's text is already without it. It is hard to believe that Ihm did not intend his compositor to set *sunt* [*tanquam*] *tamen quaedam*. If in fact he omitted the word from his collation he is still in a sense responsible for the deletion. Not everything proposed concerning the text since 1892 forwards understanding, but Fischer was probably wise not to attempt a censorship. All the readings of the Florence codex and all the earlier conjectures defended by W. Heraeus and K. Hoppe are noted in addition to the conjectures of these scholars. In view of the absence of their essays from most libraries it is a pity Fischer did not have space to describe their reasonings, which are often more instructive than their conclusions.

The orthographical and grammatical chaos of the primary carrier of the text presents the modern editor with a very nasty practical problem, whatever theoretical view he may take of the text's history. Only three systematic solutions are available, none entirely satisfactory.

One would be to print a transcript of the Florence codex and discuss each controversial item in a separate commentary. Another would be to remove nothing but scribal error from the end product of the process of redaction to which Pelagonius' treatise was undoubtedly subjected. A third would be to construct a text on the basis of the Latin manuscript evidence, of the Greek translation, of what is known about ancient medicine and of what might be conjectured about the Latin of a fourth century writer of some pretention who seemed to Vegetius not lacking in *dicendi facultas*. Ihm chose the third solution, relegating to the apparatus most of the barbarisms and solecisms that have so fascinated some of the better Latinists of the present century. Fischer has set about restoring the barbarisms and solecisms but in a strangely half-hearted way. On the one hand we encounter unaltered spellings like *clocliaris* (289; against more than twenty cases without the assimilation), *colliandri* (307; in a citation of Columella), *herbi* (24.2 et al. = *erui*), *intelligere* (34.3 et al.); forms like *austere* abl. sing. (58), *flemiam* (202), *frigidore* (141.2), *linentur* subj. (30.2), *sinceris* gen. sing. (288.2; in a citation of Celsus); syntagms like the free standing partitive genitive and the partitive apposition in ingredient lists. Conjecture also adds *absentio* (212 *absentio*), *ponfolyciae* (423 *pontoclitae*), *adicies in clysterem palumbi stercorem scrp. IIII* (132 ... *stercore* ...) and many other similar items from the linguistic dung-heap. On the other hand Fischer regularizes *callidus* to *calidus*, *chameleon* to *chamaeleon*, *cottus* to *coctus*, *friare* and *friegare* to *fricare*, *hiemps* and *hyems* to *hiems*, *his qui* to *iis qui* (even at 1.2 where the major part of the tradition of the Columellan source has *his qui*), *humor* to *umor*, *mistus* to *mixtus*, *tandiu* to *tandiu* and *transcendere* to *transcendere*. At 93 *commisce et potiones* becomes *commissoes et potiones* and at 174 *tere et puluerem facis* becomes *teres et puluerem facis* (at 46, 143 and 227 the same combination of moods is left untouched).

In place of Ihm's succinct account of all aspects of the Latinity of the Florence codex (pp.20-25) Fischer has only an 'index orthographicus' (pp.xxxviii-xl). We could have done with an equally full account of morphological and syntactical oddities. The information about the graphemes of the codex would have been more instructive if organized in relation to the phonology of 'vulgar' Latin. Proportional statistics about each phenomenon were also desirable. Our codex is quite dissimilar to the one which carries Claudius Hermerus' translation of Chiron's veterinary work. Its level of 'vulgarism' is not a great deal higher than that of some codices which carry indisputably classical or classicizing texts.

Where the text of the Florence codex makes veterinary nonsense Fischer's edition often achieves some advance over Ihm's. A very large number of the conjectures and supplements suggested by K.Hoppe are printed. The rest are put in the apparatus. Not all are palaeographically elegant or totally in harmony with the Latinity of the codex, but they do assist thought about what Pelagonius meant to say. Fischer offers over fifty new suggestions of his own, placing some in the text, recording others with due modesty in the apparatus or in the commentary. They all relate to genuine problems and most are at least worth pondering. I find merit in *acaciae* (58 *calcis*), *api* (187 *alis*), *oesypi* (323 et al. *ysopi*) and *sebi* (456 *echi*).

Fischer's commentary is of a character very different from Ihm's. It concentrates on the general substance of Pelagonius' work. The copious material adduced from Pliny and Dioscorides well illustrates the close links between human and animal medicine in antiquity. Fischer takes pains to identify in modern terms the complaints referred to by Pelagonius and the pharmaceutical substances mentioned in his cures. This is scientifically interesting and could contribute to the establishment and elucidation of the Latin text. Only factual knowledge offers protection against such scribal confusions as that between *hysopum* and *oesypum* at 323 et al. and against such falsehoods as the allegation (left uncorrected by both Ihm and Fischer) that the female goat has nineteen teeth. Fischer's use of scholastic Latin as his medium obscures, however, the value of the information he provides. It is ironical that while the Roman Church is in process of ridding itself of this antique code a publisher in a socialist state should be attempting to preserve it. Fischer also takes up from time to time the question of whether a particular cure had any efficacy, and advocates experimental tests to establish answers. This sort of question is of no philological interest. In any case, doubt so often surrounds the presence of one ingredient or another in a cure (Fischer's failure to indicate plainly all the divergences between the Florence codex and the Greek translation, to say nothing of Vegetius, Chiron and the rest of the hippiatric tradition, must here be condemned with special severity) that it would seem to be highly unethical to expose living animals to the tests proposed.

The discussions of the vocabulary and usage of the Florence codex in Ihm's commentary are few but all of high quality. The interpretation of particular phrases remain helpful even when they do not fully satisfy. Fischer only occasionally offers help in this area, and never very happily. He would have done better to cite the Greek translation with all its shortcomings. τὰ τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ὁστέα φαίνονται, δέρμα τεταμένον καὶ ἀπεσκληρωμένον, χεῖλη περικυμμένα is no more unhelpful where 267.1 *ossa in facie* < ... > *uel pellis ipsa tensa et rigida, labra adaeque gravia* (~ *Apsyrτος* αἱ τε ἐπικανθίδες αἱ ἐκ τῶν παρὰ τοὺς μυχθῆρας τόπων ἐπισπόμεναι εἰς τοὺς πόδας γυμνοῦνται, καὶ τὰ χεῖλυνια πεπέδηται) is concerned that Fischer's offhandedly dogmatic '*labra adaeque gravia*; id est *tensa et rigida*' (Ihm says nothing). κατασκευὴ μολύβματος ... πρὸς κατάναιμα for 319 *malagma ad combusturam* (the latter a common late Latin term for 'skin-burn') lacks the potential absurdity of Fischer's '*ad combusturam*: I.q. *ambustis animalibus*'. ἔπειτα ἐάν ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀνεκρεμίσθῃ εὐθὺς αὐτῷ πόνος ἐπακολουθεῖ καὶ ῥίψας ἑαυτὸν

ἀναμειτται helps a little more with 287 *deinde si satis suspensus fuerit, statim subsequitur dolor et iacet* than 'suspensus: erectus' (Ihm says nothing). For 335 *ad vulnere sordida quae pataginant* Fischer does helpfully cite Apsyrtos' πρὸς τὰ θύρακα ἔλκη καὶ νοῦς ἔχοντα (mis-describing it, however, as the Greek translation). The student will look in vain for the verb *pataginare* in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, and Fischer does not even refer to Ihm's extremely valuable note. One particularly unfortunate blunder by the Greek translator (νοῦς Εὐλινον for *assem ligneum* at 311) seems to have inspired Fischer's worst effort: '*assem: lignum planum assis magnitudine*' (for the rare use of *as* see TLL II 744.40-54).

A proper commentary on the text of the Florence codex remains to be written. Its difficulties need discursive treatment. Observations on the vocabulary cry out to be made. I note at 135 the one instance of the gross word *merda* against a dozen or more elsewhere of *stercus*. Interestingly the same sentence contains the vulgar *cum suco de coliculis* against a dozen or more cases elsewhere of *suos* and the genitive (including 161 *cum suco coliculorum*). Let him who will believe that 135 belonged (at least in its present form) to a treatise composed by the client of Arzygius.

Occasionally in reviewing books for this journal I have felt I was wasting time better spent on other activities. That was not so with Fischer's book. I learnt much from it and I must emphasize that its faults are all corrigible. Librarians should be encouraged to purchase it, but at the same time asked not to remove Ihm's edition from the shelf. Latin was better taught in the schools and universities of nineteenth century Germany than it is anywhere today.

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Review: R.J.SEAGER(Liverpool)

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B.D.MacQueen, *Plato's Republic in the Monographs of Sallust*. Chicago: Bolchazy Carducci, 1981. Pp.100. ISBN 086516 012 0. \$US12.95. Distributed by Bristol Classical Press @ £7.35.

With an *audacia* which might have brought a cynical smile to the lips of the mature Sallust, its publishers describe this slim volume as 'Inexpensive but Significant Book'. Since they offer Janson's index to the panegyrics at £50 when it is obtainable from OJMS for under £40, one would be surprised if the first of these claims were true, and indeed it is not. Even if all its hundred pages were worth reading, the book would be preposterously expensive. They are not. The ludicrous conventions of the colonial Ph.D. industry constrained MacQ. to provide a survey of what that industry persistently miscalls 'secondary literature', and quite indefensibly that survey is now reproduced. There is also a lengthy and pointless paraphrase of Plato's account of the five constitutions. Thus no reader need begin before p.37, and those with the slightest acquaintance with Plato may join at p.44.

With that necessary protest made, it must in fairness be said that the title which remains is extremely stimulating and very possibly significant. MacQ.'s thesis is that Sallust's conception of the rise and fall of Rome is entirely derived from Plato, and he makes out an interesting and powerful case. Early *concordia* is disturbed by concentration on *gloria* and *uirtus*, i.e. 'gymnastic', to the exclusion of 'music', as indicated at BC 8. Once the encouragement of *metus hostilis* was removed, *avaritia* and *ambitio*, the equivalents of Platonic oligarchy and timocracy, came to the fore. The *licentia* allowed to Sulla's army in Asia represents a (somewhat brief and peripheral, it must be admitted) democratic phase, from which Sulla emerged as tyrant. Individual equivalents are also postulated: Cato is aristocratic man, Metellus timocratic, Scaurus oligarchic, Marius democratic, Catilina tyrannic. But Sallust is not a slavish copyist. Indeed, his approach is in a sense the opposite of Plato's: where Plato looks at societies to understand the individual soul, Sallust approaches societies through the medium of individuals.

The analysis of the opening chapters of the BC is also fruitful. The first sentence is convincingly interpreted as a declaration that the theme of the work is tyranny. Sallust's ideal of the attainment of immortal *gloria* through *uirtus* of which the medium is *ingenium* is his more practical equivalent of the Platonic quest for the immortality of the soul. Catilina is presented as a tyrannical soul in a democratic society ripe for its final change, and despite his failure the character of that society remains unaltered. It merely awaits the rise of Caesar, who is branded as tyrannical by the systematic contrast between his nature and the aristocratic soul of Cato. Regrettably MacQ. then appends a structural analysis of cc.17-39, which adds nothing to his main argument and is in itself neither more nor less interesting than the dozens of other versions of this parlour-game already on the market.

The treatment of the BJ is much less satisfactory. MacQ. does not do what on his own terms he should have done: deduce the theme of the work from its opening sentence. He states that that theme is the origins of the civil war, but rarely makes it clear what civil war he means. On p.88 he opts for 'the war between Marius and Sulla', whatever that may be - Marius' expulsion in 88? His return in 87? But in 88 there was nothing that deserved the name of war, and by 87 Sulla was in the East! In any event the reference of BJ 5.2 cannot be to anything earlier than the events of 83-2, though it may be granted that *ea tempestate* at the very end looks forward to 87-6. The first sentence of BJ proclaims that *uirtus*, not *fortis*, rules men's lives.

It is clearly of great relevance to this that Marius is presented as relying heavily on fortune and that almost all his military successes are dismissed by Sallust as due to luck, a point which MacQ. fails to consider. Pursuit of this line of enquiry might well prove worthwhile. For the moment one may congratulate MacQ. on an important contribution to our understanding of Sallust, while wishing that he had chosen to communicate it in somewhat more digested form and through a much less oligarchic medium.

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D.W.THOMSON VESSEY (Queen Mary College, London): *A Cornelius Tacitus in Catullus?*

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Catullus 102 reads as follows in Mynors' OCT:

*si quicquam tacito commissum est fido ab amico
cuius sit penitus nota fides animi,
meque esse invenies illorum iure sacratum,
Corneli, et factum me esse puta Arpocratem.*

The poem is at first sight a strange and rather uninspiring one. The circumstances that led to its composition are and must remain obscure, but the general theme, that of betrayal, is a frequent one in Catullus (see my 'Thoughts on two poems of Catullus', *Latomus* 30 [1971], 45-55 at 48-55). C.J.Fordyce in his commentary, p.390, remarks: 'The lines are clumsy and crabbed even for Catullan elegiacs. As they stand, they are little more than doggerel, and the substantival *tacito*, the awkwardly placed relative clause, the co-ordination of indicative and imperative, the repeated *me esse*, are infelicities which cannot all be due to faults in transmission'. Though we may dissent from Fordyce's implicit attitude to Catullus' elegiacs in general, it is hard to disagree that this poem is problematic. Quinn in his edition (2nd ed., London 1973), p.442, also finds the substantival *tacito* 'somewhat awkward'. Can we do anything to improve matters?

I suggest that the problem may be helped by two minute changes: (1) by printing *tacito* with a capital *T* and (2) by changing *meque* in line 3 to *teque*. (1) is, of course, purely a matter of modern orthography; (2) is an emendation so slight as hardly to be counted one.

My idea is that the unknown Cornelius has (like the historian) the cognomen Tacitus, and that Catullus is playing on its meaning ('the Silent'), which Cornelius has in some way betrayed by betraying a confidence. The significance of these changes is best brought out in a prose translation: 'If any single thing has been confided to Tacitus [you whose name means 'the Silent' or ought to do so] by a faithful friend, the loyalty of whose nature is widely acknowledged, and you shall ever find yourself to be truly bound by the code that governs them, Cornelius, then consider me too to be made a Harpocrates'.

In short, Cornelius Tacitus, Cornelius 'the Silent', has revealed some secret, and his cognomen has not proved an omen. He has betrayed Catullus, who asserts that he is outstandingly loyal. The last line implies that Catullus accordingly feels that this act of faithlessness has freed him from his own obligations to confidentiality (*fides*). Only if Cornelius provides proof of his trustworthiness and lives up to the expectations of his cognomen will he find in Catullus a Harpocrates, the Roman Horus, the 'child holding his finger to his lips' (Fordyce p.391) as a symbol of the secrecy of the mysteries.

I scarcely suggest that this turns the poem into a masterpiece, but when considered in Latin, where the ambiguity *tacitus* (as epithet apparently turned noun) and Tacitus as cognomen is too subtle for word-for-word translation, it is certainly not doggerel. It is of course pure speculation (though in no way unlikely, in view of his homeland) that Catullus had a friend called Cornelius Tacitus: and the joke (if it is rightly so termed) would be understood by his friends. The name itself invites word-play: *Tacitus a non tacendo*, so to speak. I append another, and freer, rendition:

'Should anything at all, Tacitus,
supposedly 'the Silent',
ever be confided to you
by a trusting friend
(whose trustfulness of mind
is a universal byword)
and should you at any time in the future
find yourself truly bound by the code
that binds men of honour,
then, Cornelius, you will live up to your name
and may think of me too
as the God of Silence himself.'

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There are three tentative corrections, unrecorded in the edition by Diggle and Goodyear (Cambridge 1970), which I now think at least worth mention:

2.106-8

nam fortis Ilaguas

quondam per latos prostratus uulnere campos

timota sua dedit, praedis bellisque pepercit.

uincula saeva adiit (cf. 1.19-20 and 7.506-7) would make sense in the immediate context. But in view of the serious corruption in 105, the whole context is hard to appraise.

2.113

Ifurac infestis uenit consultus in armis

inconsultus may seem more appropriate, for the notion of rashness is much in mind hereabouts: cf. 104 nullas timet ille ruinas, 123 solito ... furor, 125 furor. Further, uenit as a present would accord with 87 conuenit, 118 mittit, and 121 conueniunt, also perhaps 116 descendit.

6.206-7

uiribus inde suis bellorum ductor tarena

se tutum fortemque putans ...

et arte might fit very well: cf. 4.601-3 arte ... multo callidus astu ... tutus (if this conjecture is right) and in particular 8.15-19 non uiribus audent

Carcasan nostris fretus concurrere telis,

arte sed asper agit, Latias uexare cohortes

et fugere inde parans. fugiat licet improbus astu,

non tamen effugiet: tanta superabitur arte.

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J.CRESSEY(Birkbeck College, London): *Why the Ides of March?*

LCM 7.4(Apr.1982), 60

1. Why the Ides of March?

March 15th was the festival of Anna Perenna. Macrobius' etymology (1.12.6 eodem quoque mense et publice et privatim ad Annam Perennam sacrificatum itur, ut annare perennareque commode liceat) suggests an indigenous goddess who was later conflated with Dido's sister (Ovid, Fasti 3.543ff.).

The Annae pomiferum nemus Perennae (Martial 4.64.17) was situated outside the city - the first milestone on the Flaminian Way. From Ovid's fine description of the festival it is clear that alcohol, sex and scurrility filled the day; he lays particular emphasis on the wassailing (F.3.531ff.). It was well attended, as passim indicates in lines 525-6

plebs uenit ac uirides passim disiecta per herbas

potat.

And, as Macrobius indicates, not only the canaille attended; publice suggests officials, priests. And Ovid himself had attended; for despite his disclaimer that he only encountered the drunken devotees

occurri nuper (uisa est mihi digna relatu)

pompa: senem potum pota trahebat anus,

F.3.541-2

it is clear from his vivid, detailed account that he had been there. Nice to picture Ovid, like Angel Clare in Hardy's *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*, Ch.2, the amused, slightly disdainful voyeur, the laird come to the ceilidh.

So it was a good day for a coup de main: a substantial section of the inhabitants are outside the city, drowned in drink and debauchery, while the curia of Pompey, the scene of the assassination (Cicero, de div.2.23; Plutarch, Caes.66.1) was situated c.1170 passus from the Porta Flaminia, and that's 1170 passus as the crow flies inside the city.

Frazer's notes suggest another reason why the conspirators might have regarded the day as propitious for change: 'The festival was a New Year festival; for March was the first month of the old Roman year, and the Ides of March was the first full moon of the New Year, a very appropriate day for good wishes and prayers for that and for many years to follow' (Loeb p.406).

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A.ALLEN(The Pennsylvania State University): *Propertius 1.1.13*

LCM 7.4(Apr.1982), 60

nam modo Partheniis amens errabat in antris,

ibat et hirsutas ille videre feras,

ille etiam Hylaei percussus uulnere rami

13

saucius Arcadiis rupibus ingemuit.

modo in line 11 requires an answering, temporal adverb, not just an et or an etiam. For etiam in line 13, therefore, read et iam:

ille et iam Hylaei percussus uulnere rami.

Servius' gloss (modo) on Virgil's iam ... iam (Ec1.4.43-4 and Aen.10.161-2) may be recalled. For et iam, with elision, elsewhere in Propertius, compare et iam ad (2.29.20).

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